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Optimal R&D investmentsinvestments in innovation when dealing with a stringent climate target and with
the uncertain effectiveness of R&D. The innovation needed to achieve the deep cut in emissions is modeled
by a backstop carbon-free technology whose cost depends on R&D investments. To better represent the
process of technological progress, we assume that R&D effectiveness is uncertain. By means of a simple
analytical model, we show how accounting for the uncertainty that characterizes technological advancement
yields higher investments in innovation and lower policy costs. We then conﬁrm the results via a numerical
analysis performed with a stochastic version of WITCH, an energy–economy–climate model. The results
stress the importance of a correct speciﬁcation of the technological change process in economy–climate
models.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. IntroductionTechnological change is an uncertain phenomenon. In its most
thriving form, ground-breaking innovation is so unpredictable that
any attempt to model the uncertain processes that govern it is close to
impossible. Despite the complexities, research dealing with long-term
processes, such as climate change, would largely beneﬁt from
incorporating the uncertainty of technological advance. Yet, bringing
uncertainty into models has proved particularly difﬁcult, especially
with regards to technological change, see Clarke and Weyant (2002).
On a more general level, the challenge of modelling endogenous
technological change in all its features, including randomness,
becomes increasingly important when dealing with the analysis of
stringent climate targets. Many energy–economy models have been
used to perform cost effectiveness of climate policies. Not surprisingly,
the related literature has produced a dispersed range of costs
estimates for these policies, resting on the different formulations
and assumptions that stand behind eachmodel. Nonetheless, one core
fact upon which everyone seems to agree is the role of technological
change in shaping those costs, see for example the summary of aned out by the Climate Change
azione Eni Enrico Mattei. In
.Scan project, supported by the
e thank seminar participants at
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+39 2 520 36946.
.
ll rights reserved.updated modeling comparison exercise on innovation in Grubb et al.
(2006).
The recognition of the relevance of this issue has led researchers to
model technological change as an endogenous process, although
typically in a deterministic fashion. The existing literature accounting
for uncertainty has mostly concentrated on the uncertainty affecting
climate damages and abatement costs, as well as other parameters,
such as the discount factor. Within this framework, few studies have
looked at the consequences of uncertainty on innovation. In particular,
Baker et al. (2006a) investigate the effects of climate uncertainty on
R&D investments, to verify whether innovation serves as a hedge
against uncertainty, but ﬁnd no unambiguous answer: optimal R&D
might increase or decrease with uncertainty depending on a variety of
factors regarding the speciﬁcation of technological change and
uncertainty.
However, as noted above, little focus has been devoted to the
analysis of the intrinsic uncertainty of innovation, and how uncertainty
might change results and policy recommendations. Baker and Adu-
Bonnah (2008) is the only case to our knowledge that tackles this
issue in the context of climate change.1 They analyze how optimal R&D
investments changewith the risk-proﬁle of the R&D program andwith
climate uncertainty. They differentiate between two types of
technologies, and ﬁnd that technological speciﬁcation and climate
damages are key in the role played by uncertainty.1 Outside the climate change literature, the theory of investment under uncertainty
and the real option literature has been extensively applied to study R&D investments.
S19V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S18–S26The current paper delves into the issue of uncertain technological
progress when a climate obligation is in place. In particular, we seek to
analyze different optimal responses in terms of investments and
climate policy costs when we model innovation as a backstop
technology characterized by either a deterministic or an uncertain
process. To this scope, we ﬁrst develop a simple analytical model.
Then, we augment the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH,
introduced in Bosetti et al. (2006), to incorporate a carbon-free
backstop technology whose cost is currently not competitive but can
be lowered by investing in innovation in the form of R&D. The R&D
outcome is modeled as uncertain, and we thus devise a stochastic
version of the model to account for this effect. We restrict our analysis
to a climate policy of 450 ppmv CO2 only (i.e. roughly 550 CO2e)
stabilization.
Both our analytical and numerical results show how accounting for
the uncertainty of technological advancement yields higher invest-
ments in innovation aimed to decrease the abatement costs via a
backstop technology. The analytical set-up provides an unequivocal
relation between the uncertainty and innovation effort, and the
richness of the numerical model a thorough representation of the
impacts in terms of technological change. The ﬁndings of this paper
stress the importance of a correct speciﬁcation of technological change
in economy–climate models when assessing the optimal level of R&D
investments as well as the cost of a climate policy. Our results are in
line with Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008), although in our case the
results are independent of the climate target.
The paper is structured as follows: in the next section we devise a
simple toy model, and present the ﬁrst analytical insights. Section 3
deals with the implementation of uncertain technological change in
the WITCH model, and shows the numerical results. Section 4
concludes.
2. A simple model of uncertain innovation
To analyze the issue of uncertain innovationwe introduce a simple
analytical model. We use a two-period, two-technology model where
the social planner minimizes costs but needs to achieve a given
environmental target. We resort to such a standard framework to
ensure an analogy with the climate change policies costs effectiveness
studies of numerical models, such as those presented in the second
part of the paper. Although less realistic than the numerical counter-
part, such a framework mimics the most essential features of the
numerical analysis and can thus provide a useful generalization of the
problem.
Given a target level of abatement to be undertaken during the
second period, the planner can choose a combination of two carbon-
free technologies: a traditional technology (say nuclear ﬁssion) and an
advanced, backstop technology (say nuclear fusion). Abatement costs
with the backstop technology are initially higher than with the
traditional one, but can be reduced by investing in R&D during the ﬁrst
period. We introduce uncertainty by modeling the R&D outcome on
the abatement cost of the backstop technology as uncertain: the
innovation effort leads to a central value reduction in abatement costs
with a given probability p, and to lower and higher abatement costs
states with probability 1− pð Þ
2
, respectively. The high cost state
represents the failure of the R&D program: abatement costs are not
reduced by the innovation effort, and remain higher than the
traditional carbon-free technology costs for any level of abatement.
In this case, the planner chooses not to operate the backstop
technology, because it is too costly, and resorts to the, cheaper,
traditional technology. The low cost state represents a greater than
expected success of the R&D program: backstop technology costs are
always lower than in the central case, the lower the costs the higher
the abatement pursued with the advanced technology.
The objective of the social planner is to choose the optimal level of
investment in innovation, together with abatement shares in bothtraditional and backstop technologies, such that expected total costs
are minimized subject to a given level of abatement. Formally:
min
I
C Ið Þ + Ew minμT ;μB CT μTð Þð Þ + C μB; I;wð Þ
 
s:t: μT + μB = μ μT; μB; Iz0
ð1Þ
where I, µT, µB are respectively the innovation effort (i.e. investment in
R&D) and the abatement in the traditional and backstop technologies.
C, CT, CB are the respective cost functions. w represents the uncertain
effectiveness of R&D. μ is the exogenously set abatement target.
This formulation requires that the abatement cost functions using
the two technologies are separable. That is, we assume that an amount
of abatement undertaken using one technology doesn't affect the costs
of abatement using the other technology. Although this assumption is
often violated in real world application, where technologies develop
around common technological clusters, we retain it here as we model
the two abatement technologies as belonging to very different classes,
e.g. concentrated base load providers such nuclear or CCS on one side,
and smaller scale intermittent renewables on the other.
To simplify the problem, let's assume the backstop technology
takes value CB(µB, I) with probability p, while with probability 1− p2
R&D is more effective and backstop costs are lower than expected
(and equal to CBL(µBL , I)). In the remaining 1− p2 cases, R&D fails, and the
costs of backstop technology are not modiﬁed by innovation (and are
equal to CBH(µBH)). As stated earlier, the main scope of our analysis is to
compare the certain formulation (case where p=1) vis à vis the most
uncertain one (case where p=0). In order to make these two cases
equivalent, we equate the central case cost function to the mean
between the high and low case, i.e. we set:
CB μB; Ið Þ =
1
2
CHB μBð Þ +
1
2
CLB μB; Ið Þ ð2Þ
The problem can thus be restated as follows:
min
I
C Ið Þ + pmin
μCT ;μ
C
B
CT μTð Þ + CCB μCB ; I
 h i
+
1− p
2
min
μLT ;μ
L
B
CT μ
L
T
 
+ CLB μ
L
B; I
 h i
+
1− p
2
min
μHT ;μ
H
B
CT μ
H
T
 
+ CHB μ
H
B
 h i
8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
s:t: μ iT + μ
i
B = μ μ
i
T; μ
i
B; Iz0 i = C; L;H
ð3Þ
Solving the problem backward and labeling with ⁎ the optimal
values for the abatement shares in the two technologies, we can
simplify our expression in the following way:
min
I
C Ið Þ + p CT μC⁎T
 
+ CB μ
C⁎
B ; I
 h i
+
1− p
2
CT μ
L⁎
T
 
+ CLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
 h i
+
1− p
2
CT μð Þ
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
s:t: μ iT + μ
i
B = μ μ
i
T; μ
i
B; Iz0 i = C; L
ð4Þ
where the third term in brackets, the optimal cost in the case the R&D
program fails, is the cost of traditional technology only, i.e.
CT μHT
 
+ CHB μ
H
B
 
= CT μð Þ.
One of the questions we are interested in tackling with this set-up
is the effect of uncertainty on the costs of meeting the environmental
obligation. For example, wemight wonder whether knowing that R&D
will make the backstop technology either extremely competitive or
totally ineffective affects the costs of reducing carbon emissions with
respect to the case of certain average innovation effectiveness. The
following result clariﬁes this issue.
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technology in the central case are equal to the average of the low and high
R&D effectiveness cases (Eq. (2)), the total costs of meeting the
environmental target are higher for the central certain case. For the
algebra underlying this result, we refer the reader to Appendix A. This
result suggests that R&D programmes with high/low payoffs are
preferable whenever an alternative, less advanced, abating technology
is available to limit the downside of R&D failure.
A second issuewe seek to investigate is the effect of uncertaintyon the
behavior of investments inR&D, i.e.we ask ourselveswhat is the sign of dI
⁎
dp
.
If dI
⁎
dp
b0 thenwehave that R&D investments increasewith uncertainty. This
would imply that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome, a fact
oftenbelieved tobe thecase,wouldyielda shareof innovationhigher than
if uncertainty were neglected. In Appendix B we prove that investigating
the signof dI
⁎
dp
coincideswith comparingmarginal beneﬁts of innovation for
different levels of abatement:
MBC μC⁎B
 
− MBC μL⁎B
 
≶0?
where MB stands for the reduction in abatement cost using the
backstop technology as a result of a marginal dollar spent on
innovation.2
The equation compares the marginal beneﬁt of innovation in the
central case computed for levels of abatement resulting from the
central and low cost cases, µB⁎ and µBL⁎; its sign depends on how the
marginal beneﬁt of R&D changes with the level of abatement. In this
paper we restrict our attention to the case of innovation lowering the
marginal abatement costs for every level of abatement.3 Thus,
marginal beneﬁts weakly increase with abatement. Therefore, since
abatement in the low case is always higher than (or at least equal to)
the abatement in the central case (µBL⁎≥µBC⁎), we ﬁnd that dI
⁎
dp
V0, which
leads us to the second result.
Result 2. We assume that marginal beneﬁts of innovation increase with
abatement using the backstop technology. Then, for interior solutions for
the abatement variables, investments in innovation increase with
uncertainty. Conversely, innovation is uninﬂuenced by uncertainty
for the case μL⁎B = μ
C⁎
B = μ , the corner solution implying that the
traditional technology is never employed when innovation is
productive. In addition, this latter result also holds when marginal
beneﬁts of innovation are constant with abatement, for examplewhen
innovation shifts down the abatement curve by a constant.
Ruling out the last two special cases, the intuition for the result is
the following. Let us concentrate on the two extreme cases of zero
uncertainty, i.e. the central case is always achieved (p=1), and full
uncertainty, i.e. R&D has either full success or full failure with 50%
chance each (p=0). Choosing the optimal level of R&D investments
implies equating the marginal costs of generating innovationwith the
marginal beneﬁts of decreasing the abatement costs. When confront-
ing the two cases, we should compare the marginal beneﬁts of
innovation for the central value (zero uncertainty) and low value (full
uncertainty). The latter has half the chances of occurring, but marginal
beneﬁts are by construction twice those of the central case, so that the
fraction due to the probability cancels out. However, since the share of
abatement using the backstop technology is higher in the low cost
case and assuming that marginal beneﬁts increase with the level of
abatement, marginal beneﬁts of innovation are higher with full
uncertainty than with no uncertainty. That is, innovation is more
productive when its outcome is explicitly modelled as uncertain.2 The traditional technology is eliminated from the marginal analysis for the
Envelope Theorem since it is not affected by the innovation in the backstop technology
as noted in the above discussion on the abatement cost functions separability. We
thank an anonymous referee for clarifying this issue.
3 This directly follows from the choice of investigating R&D efforts reducing the costs
of a backstop, carbon-free, technology, as discussed in detail later in the paper.How does this ﬁnding translate into real life considerations? First, one
has to bear in mind that the social planner can pick from a variety of
technologies to achieve an environmental target, say, to reduce CO2
emissions. Investing inR&D is a riskyprocedure.However, if it fails existing
technologies would be able to limit the costs of abatement, whereas if it is
successful, the beneﬁts would be higher than would have been in the
central case. This payoff asymmetry is such that the upside of super
productive innovation outweighs the downside of failure. Hence, in the
presence of innovative technologies, a risk-neutral planner would choose
to invest more when R&D outcome is uncertain.
Our set-up and results are similar to those in Baker and Adu-
Bonnah (2008). They too ﬁnd that the relation between uncertainty
and innovation depends on whether marginal beneﬁts of R&D
increase or decrease with the level of abatement. Even though the
sign of this relationship is in principle ambiguous, this ambiguity
depends on what technology is under consideration (see Baker et al.
(2006b)). R&D aimed at cleaner and more efﬁcient carbon technol-
ogies has increasing marginal beneﬁts for moderate emissions
reductions; however, this positive effect decreases and eventually
drops to zero as the game gets tougher and stringent emission
reductions have to be met. A different story holds for carbon-free
technologies, where the effect of R&D is that of lowering the marginal
cost curves for any level of abatement. So the issue of ambiguity in the
sign could be interpreted more practically as: what type of
technologies is technical change affecting in the model? When large
emission cuts are at stake, carbon technologies have a lower margin
for efﬁcient improvement than carbon-free technologies (i.e. nuclear,
renewables, carbon-free backstop) which would play a major role. In
this case marginal beneﬁts of innovation are increasing with the level
of abatement. Conversely, in the case of moderate climate policy,
efﬁciency improvement would play a relevant role. But again, in this
case marginal beneﬁts of innovation would hardly decrease in the
range of abatement under consideration, given the small mitigation
effort required. This argument justiﬁes the increasing marginal
beneﬁts assumption that is behind our results.4
In contrast with Baker and Adu-Bonnah (2008), our result is
independent of how stringent the climate target might be. Since the
productivity gain from the low cost case is always twice that of the
central case, the upside of an uncertain program outweighs the
downside, notwithstanding the level of abatement. In the limit case
when abatement is totally achieved by the backstop technology in
both central and low cost cases, then uncertainty would not affect the
optimal choice of R&D.
3. Numerical analysis
In this section we turn to the numerical analysis of the model. In
order to investigate the role of uncertain technological change, we
devise a version of the energy–economy–climate model WITCH
featuring an R&D-driven carbon-free backstop technology. Innovation
can lower the price of this otherwise non-competitive technology, but
it is modeled in a stochastic setting in order to account for the
uncertainty of the R&D outcome. We ﬁrst introduce the backstop
technology sector and then discuss numerical results for different
simulation experiments.
3.1. Uncertain backstop technology in WITCH
WITCH—World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model—is an
integrated assessment model for the analysis of climate change and
energy issues. For a detailed description of the model see Bosetti et al.4 Mathematically, innovation shifting down abatement curve ensures that the value
function of the minimization problem is convex in the shift. Thus, the cost asymmetry
inequality shown in Eq. (10) holds because of Jensen inequality. We thank an
anonymous referee for this remark.
Fig. 1. CO2 emissions in the BAU and 450 ppmv cases.
S21V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S18–S26(2006, 2007). It is a regional model featuring an inter-temporal
optimal growth top-down part that is hard linked with a bottom-up
description of the energy sector. The energy sector is described by
nested constant elasticity of substitution functions which describe the
transformation of primary energy carriers into ﬁnal energy services.
World regions strategically interact in a game theoretic set-up by
playing an open-loop Nash game on global externalities. Technological
change is endogenous and acts both via energy efﬁciency R&D and
learning-by-doing in power capacity. The model is solved numerically
with GAMS/CONOPT.
The non-cooperative baseline predicts global CO2 emissions to reach
around 20 GtC by 2100, a ﬁgure in line with IPCC B2 SRES scenarios.
These ﬁgures show how the free-riding incentives that characterize
global stock externalities such as CO2 make it difﬁcult to achieve
substantial emission reduction in a cost beneﬁt analysis setting.
Concerns over the risk of prolonged emissions put forward by
climatologists and specialized bodies such as the IPCC justify the resort
to cost effectiveness analysis of given climate goals. In this paper we
focus on the speciﬁc target of stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrationFig. 2. Power generation shares in the 450 ppmv stabilization case. From top to boto 450 ppmv (550 ppmv CO2 equivalent) by 2100, a target probabil-
istically associated with that of maintaining within 2 °C the global
temperature increase above pre-industrial level within the century.
As evident from Fig. 1, a climate policy of this kind entails signiﬁcant
emission reductions: for example, an emission path respecting the
450 ppmv targetwould curb emissions by 50% in 2030, and up to 85% by
the end of the century. Such a scenario is clearly challenging, and will
come at a cost in terms of economic growth, without adequate
technological advancement.
For example, simulations using theWITCHmodel show that on the
basis of currently existing technologies the stabilization effort would
lead to a power generation mix such as the one shown in Fig. 2. Three
technologies are believed to provide the low/zero carbon electricity
indispensable in such a severe mitigation scenario. First, early
deployment of advanced coal combined with CCS to achieve some of
the needed reductions of emissions. Second, nuclear power that
would become the predominant technology by mid-century, with
almost half of the electricity share. Finally, renewables, expected to
signiﬁcantly contribute from the second half of the century. Inttom: nuclear, hydro, oil, gas, trad. coal, advanced coal + CCS, wind and solar.
Fig. 3. Scenario tree in the stochastic version of WITCH. Variables, as ICback in this example, are redeﬁned depending on nodes.
S22 V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S18–S26addition to this, given the comparatively greater difﬁculty in cutting
emissions in the non-electricity sector, R&D-driven energy saving will
also be indispensable.
A stabilization scenario of this kind appears ambitious, for a variety of
reasons. First, it would imply considerable costs, quantiﬁable in a net
present value output loss during this century of around 2% (at a constant
discount rate of 5%). Second, current technologies facemanyconstraints. A
massive deployment of nuclear energy would entail increased waste
management costs and proliferation risks: the lack of resolution of these
problems—for instance through technological advances—means the
scenario will be unlikely to develop. Similarly, the high land use demand
of currently available renewables technologies in power generation,
constitutes a serious challenge for the penetration target needed to
stabilize at 450 ppmv. Unavoidably, any stringent stabilization scenario
will call for innovation in non-carbon energy technologies. Future energy
scenarios depending on such backstop technologies cannot be conceived
without a focuson thecrucial roleofR&D investments as themain impulse
fostering the required technological innovation.
We follow the lines of the toymodel by introducing anR&Ddependent
backstop technology in WITCH. We model it as a power generation
technology, that emits zero carbon per unit of electricity and is renewable
in the sense that it doesn't rely on rapidly exhaustible natural resources. It
couldbe thoughtof as a ground-breaking innovation suchas fusionpower,
or more likely as a portfolio of advanced versions of technologies such as
advanced solar power, new nuclear etc. We assume this representative
technology to be currently uneconomical, but that its cost can be
decreased by means of investments in innovation. This framework is
coherent with the one used in the analytical model in the ﬁrst part of the
paper. The “traditional” nuclear power technology can be substituted by a
cheaper (e.g. deployable on a larger scale) one, only if enough R&D
investments are deployed.
Speciﬁcally, the investment cost for building a unit of power
capacity ($/kW), ICback, depends on cumulated R&D, KR&Dback, via a
power formulation as follows5:
ICback n; tð Þ =
ICback n;0ð Þ
1 + KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη
ð5Þ
i.e. at time t, for region n, the investment cost decreases with the R&D
capital depending on the learning parameter η.6 The capital
depreciates with rate δ and can be increased by investing in
knowledge IR&Dback through an innovation possibility frontier of
this kind:
KR&Dback n; t + 1ð Þ= 1−δð ÞKR&Dback n; tð Þ
+ aIR&Dback t;nð ÞbKR&Dback t;nð Þc
ð6Þ5 This speciﬁcation is similar to that used for experience curves, and has been
applied to backstops by Popp (2006).
6 In this ﬁrst application learning occurs independently at a regional level. As a
future extension of the model we plan to include international spillovers of knowledge.The presence of the stock in the possibility frontier ensures the
“standing on shoulders” effect, and the exponents b and c sum up to
less than one to model diminishing returns to research. Such a
formulation has received empirical support for energy innovation by
Popp (2004).
We assume that the backstop technology enters as a linear
substitute of nuclear power in the energy sector nest; in this way
we allow the new technology to displace the technology that most
controversially contributed to carbon-free energy generation in the
original formulation of the model; at the same time the nested CES
structure of the electricity sector with higher than unity elasticities
allows the phase out of all other power generation plants, although at
a higher cost than would have otherwise happened assuming linear
relations. To account for the industrialization lag that stands between
research and commercialization, the backstop technology is assumed
to be available from 2050 onwards only, even though we will test our
result also for different entry periods.
Our primary interest in this paper is to analyze the effect of
modeling uncertainty on the level of investments and on the costs of
the policy. To account for this, we model the outcome of the R&D
investments as uncertain: thus ICback(n, t, w) also depends on the
state of the world, w. We assume that the effectiveness of R&D on
decreasing the backstop costs can turn out to be either of the three
following cases: in the “best” case (w=b) the investment cost of the
backstop decreases with R&D as shown in Eq. (5); in the “failure” case
(w= f) the investment cost of the backstop remains the same as the
initial one, irrespective of the level of investments. This R&D failure
case is equivalent to assume that the learning parameter η is equal to
zero. Both these low and high cost states have the probability of
occurring 1− p
2
each. In the “central” case (w=c), with remaining p
chances, the investment cost is the average of the two limit cases. To
summarize:
1− p
2
: ICback n; t; bð Þ = ICback n;0ð Þ1 + KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη
p : ICback n; t; cð Þ = 12 ICback n;0ð Þ1 + KR&Dback t;nð Þð Þη +
1
2
ICback n;0ð Þ
1− p
2
: ICback n; t; fð Þ = ICback n;0ð Þ
ð7Þ
This framework mimics the toy model presented in the previous
section and allows us to control for the effect of R&D uncertainty. We
can run the model for different values of p—the probability of the
central case—and evaluate the consequences of uncertainty on
innovation. In order to include in the model these concomitant
alternative scenarios we develop an implicit7 stochastic version of the
WITCH model. All model variables, previously deﬁned on regions,
time and scenarios, are redeﬁned on nodes belonging to a scenarios7 Instead of accounting explicitly for the non-anticipative constraints, non-
anticipativity is implicitly deﬁned through characterization of predecessor/successor
relationships among nodes in the scenario tree.
Fig. 4. R&D investments for backstop.
S23V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S18–S26tree as the one depicted in Fig. 3. The objective function to be
maximized for each region is the expected utility.
3.2. Numerical results
In this section we report results from the numerical exercise carried
outwithWITCH. ACO2 only concentration target of 450 ppmv is assumed
throughout the analysis. We compare the deterministic case with the
uncertain formulation. The average of the latter coincides with the
deterministic one to ensure the equivalence of the comparison exercise. InFig. 5. Electricity wtheuncertain formulation there is a 50% chance to achieve the central case
and a 25% chance to achieve the failure and best cases, respectively. In
accordance with the analytical analysis, we assume a risk-neutral social
planner (we will then relax this assumption).
Since we are investigating the role of uncertainty on innovation, it
is interesting to compare the R&D investments in the stochastic case
and in the equivalent deterministic case, before uncertainty is
resolved in 2050. Results of investments on innovation are presented
in Fig. 4; the graph shows that optimal R&D investments are always
higher in the stochastic formulation with respect to the deterministicith backstop.
Fig. 6. Electricity with nuclear.
8 In order to preserve the base year consumption and savings ﬁgures we have
adjusted the social time preference rate according to the new risk aversion value.
S24 V. Bosetti, M. Tavoni / Energy Economics 31 (2009) S18–S26case before the resolution of uncertainty. The numerical analysis thus
conﬁrms that modeling R&D as having an uncertain outcome induces
more innovation effort, as predicted by the analytical example outlined
in Section 2. As expected, in the stochastic setting, once uncertainty is
resolved, R&D is higher for the best case than for the central, and it is
zero for the failure state.
To provide an insight into what different R&D investment paths
imply in terms of technology adoption throughout the century, in
Fig. 5 we show the values of electricity generated with the backstop
technology in the various cases. From the last Figure we know that the
R&D investments in the deterministic case are low compared to the
stochastic one: such a reduced innovation effort sets back the
competitiveness of the backstop technology. This translates into a
lower deployment of the innovative technology in the deterministic
case vis à vis the stochastic one, as is apparent from the graph (with
the obvious exception of the R&D “failure” case).
As expected, the opposite behavior holds with regard to the
existing technology competing with the backstop, i.e. nuclear power:
the higher costs of the backstop technology lead to a higher nuclear
power share in the deterministic formulation than in the uncertain
one (except for the failure case, see Fig. 6). All in all, accounting for
R&D uncertainty fosters the deployment of innovative technologies
such as the backstop one. Through the path dependencies that
characterize the evolution of technologies, this would act as a control
on the negative externalities that affect the currently used technol-
ogies and deﬁne their limited deployment capacity. For example, in
the WITCH model we explicitly account for waste management and
proliferation risks (as well as uranium ore costs) as a global
externality countries have incentives to free-ride on. The higher
investments in innovation stemming from the uncertain characteriza-
tion of R&D have the effect of reducing this externality.
The other issue we are dealing with in this paper is the effect of
R&D uncertainty on the costs of complying to the climate policy. Are
we miscalculating stabilization costs by neglecting uncertain efﬁcacy
of innovation in fostering a backstop technology? And, more generally,
what is the role of a carbon-free power generation technology in
determining these costs?Numerical results again conﬁrm the insights of the analytical
model: policy costs are always lower when accounting for uncertainty,
reaching a 2.3% gain by the end of the century with respect to the
deterministic case. Although limited by the presence of an existing,
largely deployable, carbon-free technology, such as the nuclear one,
these cost variations indicate that modeling uncertainty explicitly
alleviates the mitigation burden of the climate policy.
In order to test the results for robustness and to understand the
effect of key assumptions, we have repeated simulations for a different
set of assumptions on entry time and the level of risk aversion.8
In Fig. 7 we present the R&D results when we assume different
entry times of the backstop technology (“early” in 2040, and “late” in
2060). The picture shows that early resolution of uncertainty on the
efﬁcacy of the R&D programme leads to a higher level of optimal R&D
investments. The contrary holds in the case of late discovery of the
program's effectiveness. Although the effect on the levels of invest-
ments is signiﬁcant, entry time has a small impact on policy costs. As
noted above, this result depends on the presence of the traditional
carbon-free technology (nuclear) which has a buffer effect.
As a concluding analysis, we drop the assumption of risk neutrality
and investigate what happens when the central planner is risk-averse.
In this case, lower utility is attached to risky investments, and thus we
expect toﬁnd an effect contrary to the results presented so far.We start
by analysing the unit risk aversion case of logarithmic utility function.
Numerical results show that R&D investments in the uncertainty case
are indeed lower than for the reference risk-neutral analysis. The risk
aversion increase roughly halves innovation effort: for example, R&D
investments in 2050 drop from 10 to 5 USD billions. Despite this effect,
they remain higher than for the certain case (that for example has 2.2
USD billions investments in 2050), thus conﬁrming that the R&D
fostering effect of uncertainty remain valid for central planners with
unit risk version. Finally, we searched the risk aversion parameter for
which R&D investments are equal in both the certain and uncertain
cases. With the uncertainty parametrization used throughout the
Fig. 7. Effect of entry time on backstop R&D investment.
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risk aversion coefﬁcient of 1.5 invests in innovation equally in both the
certain and uncertain cases. Higher risk aversions would result in
lower innovation shares under uncertainty.
4. Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed the issue of uncertain technological
progress within environmental regulation. This is an important
research topic given the relevance of technical change in the global
warming literature and the uncertainty that characterizes all innova-
tion processes, yet a poorly investigated one. We have analyzed
optimal responses to uncertainty, in terms of R&D investments and
climate policy costs, by modeling innovation as a backstop technology
characterized by either a deterministic or an uncertain process. To this
purpose, we have developed a simple analytical model and modiﬁed
the hybrid integrated assessment model WITCH to account for a
carbon-free backstop technology dependent on uncertain R&D
realizations. We have performed a stochastic cost effectiveness
analysis of a CO2 stabilization policy of 450 ppmv.
Numerical results, in accordance with analytical insights, have
shown how modeling innovation in a backstop technology as an
uncertain process leads to higher optimal levels of R&D investments.
A detailed representation of the energy sector has allowed us to
capture path dependency in technological evolution, and therefore
to account for the consequences of different innovation efforts on
technology deployment and externality resolution. We have also
shown how uncertainty lowers climate policy costs, although the
rigidity of the energy sector—characterized by long-lasting invest-
ments with limited substitutability—is shown to constrain the
contribution of a technology breakthrough solely in the electricity
sector.
To check for the robustness of the results, we have tested the need
to model R&D uncertainty as an endogenous process by letting the
backstop entry time vary. We have shown how different timings of
backstop availability affect R&D investments and policy costs in the
expected direction but to a limited extent in terms of magnitude.
Finally, the role of social planner risk aversion has been analyzed and
shown to have a counterbalancing effect that reduces the gap in
innovation investments with and without uncertainty.
In this ﬁrst version of the model we have not considered the
possibility of international spillover of knowledge. This is an issue that
is relevant in both policy and modeling terms, as it can inducecontrasting effects. We are investigating it in a follow-up analysis.
Finally, future research includes the evaluation of innovation
uncertainty on the choice of policy instruments with a speciﬁc focus
on the role of free-riding.
Appendix A
Result 1. Within the analytical framework sketched in Section 2 we
prove that the costs of complying to the environmental target
diminish in uncertainty.
That is, labeling with V the optimal costs for the problem outlined
in Eq. (1), we need to show that dV
dp
N 0:
The value function of the minimization problem is as follows:
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From the envelope theorem we know that:
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The right hand side of the equation is the sum of the minimized
costs in the best and worst (failure) cases, respectively. Evaluating the
best case function at a different abatement level, for instance at the
one that is optimal for the central case, would yield higher costs, so we
can write:
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and thus, in order to prove Eq. (10) it sufﬁces to show that:
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We know that the central case abatement cost CBC is the average of
the best and failure cases for any abatement. That is,
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we can rewrite the condition for costs diminishing in uncertainty as:
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The LHS of the last equation is the cost of meeting the abatement
target in the failure case with a suboptimal allocation of abatement
between the technologies. By construction, abatement cost is
minimized in this case by doing all the work with the traditional
technology. Therefore the RHS is optimal and must have a lower cost
than the suboptimal LHS.
Appendix B
Result 2. We investigate the sign of dI
⁎
dp
, knowing that if dI
⁎
dp
b0 then we
have that R&D investments increase with uncertainty.
We focus on the case of an interior solution for the choice variable.
Then, the optimality condition with respect to I ensures that the
solution value satisﬁes:
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Themarginal costs of innovation equate themarginal beneﬁts from
reduced abatement costs in the central and low cost cases, weighted
by the probability of occurrence of both states.
Implicit differentiation with respect to p yields:
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Rearranging terms:
dI⁎
dp
d2C I⁎
 
dI2
+ p
d2CCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
+ 1− p
2
d2CLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI2
8<
:
9=
;
= −
dCCB μ
C⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
+
1
2
dCLB μ
L⁎
B ; I
⁎
 
dI
ð17ÞIt is reasonable to assume convex cost functions in I (i.e. increasing
marginal costs of innovation, and decreasing marginal beneﬁts of
innovation to abatement); the left hand side term of the expression is
then positive, and the sign of dI
⁎
dp
is determined by the sign of the right
hand side of the last equation.
The right hand side confronts the innovation marginal beneﬁts for
the central and low cost cases. From Eq. (2) we know that the
marginal beneﬁts in the low cost case are twice those of the central
case. We can rewrite the right end side of Eq. (17) as follows:
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We have obtained that the sign of dI
⁎
dp
depends onwhether marginal
beneﬁts of R&D investments are increasing with abatement or not.
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